Dark theme: inbound email HTML intentionally keeps its own inline colors
for fidelity (sanitize-html.ts), but a sender's hardcoded dark text (the
common case) was unreadable once the surrounding chrome went dark. Now
forced to the theme's own text color in dark mode only; light mode keeps
full fidelity as before.
Send button: deliverAgentMessage awaited the outbound email/Telegram send
*before* recording the reply, so a broken mail/bot account (e.g. bad SMTP
creds) made the reply vanish entirely — not sent, not saved, no error
shown — with the API's catch-all masking the real cause as a generic
"Ticket not found". Channel delivery is now best-effort: the reply is
always recorded even if outbound delivery fails, and real errors surface
to the compose box instead of failing silently.
IMAP watchdog: a live IDLE connection has gone quietly unresponsive in
production more than once, with mail landing server-side but never
noticed here and no error ever firing. Added a periodic forced NOOP
round-trip with its own deadline, independent of ImapFlow's internal
socket timeout, that tears down and reconnects a connection that stops
answering.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Gh2UXUQUVBWroWEnn1FLFG
A bare <img> in a rendered email body wasn't wrapped in any link, so the
only way to see it full-size was the browser's right-click "open image in
new tab". sanitizeEmailHtml now wraps every image that isn't already inside
a real link (a sender-linked banner is left alone, no double-wrapping) in
<a href={its own src} target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"> — a normal
left click, middle click, or ctrl-click all now do the expected thing.
The wrapping step (lib/mail/sanitize-html.ts, using the new cheerio dep)
builds the <a> via .attr() rather than string-interpolating the src into an
HTML template — sanitize-html only validates an img src's URL *scheme*, not
that a data: URI's declared content is actually image data, so a crafted
src could otherwise contain characters that break out of an attribute if
naively concatenated into HTML text for re-parsing. Covered by 3 new tests
in sanitize-html.test.ts, including that exact injection attempt.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GteWhnWKTmnXcsd5jx6H7u
Inbound HTML emails were being flattened through html-to-text for display,
which lost all formatting and — for images embedded as data: URIs — leaked
the raw base64 as visible "[data:image/png;base64,...]" link text (an
Outlook/webmail screenshot-paste artifact). Customer messages now also
store a sanitized HTML rendering (messages.body_html) that preserves the
sender's fonts/colors/layout and shows inline images (data: URIs render
natively; cid: references are rewritten to the matching attachment's
serving URL via a new attachments.content_id column). Sanitization is a
tag/style allowlist (lib/mail/sanitize-html.ts, covered by
sanitize-html.test.ts) — no script/event handlers/javascript: hrefs, no
layout-breaking CSS. The plain-text fallback (used for channels other than
email) also drops image/data-URI link text via html-to-text selectors, for
the same underlying bug on that path.
Also: pasting a screenshot (Ctrl+V) into the agent reply box now attaches
it directly, reusing the existing attachment-upload/email-delivery path —
no more "save to disk, then click attach" round trip.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GteWhnWKTmnXcsd5jx6H7u
ogrechkoandClaude Sonnet 5